Chapter 1

Power Projection

"We are more and more an expeditionary force; strategic air and sealift, complemented by our pre-positioning initiatives, must be our number one priority."

General John M. Shalikashvili
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

FM 100-7 defines "power projection" as the ability of the US to apply any combination of economic, diplomatic, informational, or military instruments of national power. Projection of military force is a critical component of our power projection capability.

SECTION I. - MILITARY FORCE PROJECTION

1-1. Until the end of the Cold War, a keystone of Army doctrine was *forward presence*. In Europe, for example, the United States (US) Army maintained two corps and robust theater sustainment capabilities. In addition, large stockpiles of supplies and equipment configured to unit sets were pre-positioned to equip reinforcing forces deploying from the continental US (CONUS). On the ground in Europe, a theater Army area command (TAACOM) provided logistics command and control (C2) in the communications zone (COMMZ). This was a very robust headquarters. Using a network of area support groups (ASGs) and a variety of other subordinate commands, a TAACOM provided continuous, responsive C2 throughout the COMMZ. In addition, there were other functional commands, such as the personnel command (PERSCOM), medical command (MEDCOM), transportation command (TRANSCOM), engineer command (ENCOM) and finance command (FINCOM), that provided functionally oriented support to the theater of operations.

1-2. The end of the Cold War generated a changing world environment that has diminished the probability of a prolonged, large-scale conventional war. The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement emphasizes worldwide engagement and the enlargement of the community of free market democracies. This new national security strategy calls for flexible and selective engagement in response to a broad range of activities and capabilities to address and help shape the evolving international environment.

1-3. A central strategic concept in the National Military Strategy of the United States is power projection. Power projection includes the ability of the United States armed forces to deploy air, land, and sea forces to any region in the world and sustain them for missions spanning the operational continuum. US requirements for military force projection include emphasis on rapid deployment of combat power and military operations designed to terminate conflicts as quickly as possible on terms that are favorable to the US and its allies. Within that framework, the Army's contribution to force projection is the demonstrated ability to rapidly alert, mobilize, and field a force that is deployable, lethal, versatile, expandable, and sustainable.

SECTION II. - THEATER STRUCTURE

1-4. To understand theater distribution, it is important to understand what a theater is and how it is structured. A theater is a geographical area outside the continental United States (OCONUS) for which a commander of a unified command is assigned military responsibility (Joint Publication [JP] 1-02). From the strategic context, it is a required level of international military cooperation or the degree of necessary dedicated US military resources. These perspectives may influence how the Army conducts operations in each theater.

THEATER OF WAR

1-5. When the National Command Authorities (NCA) authorize combat operations, a joint forces commander (JFC), with NCA and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approval, delineates a strategic theater of war. Part of a theater may be in a state of war, while other areas remain in conflict or peace (see Figure 1-1).



Figure 1-1. Theater Organization During War

THEATER OF OPERATIONS

1-6. If the JFC determines that he should subdivide his theater of war to contend with more than one major threat, he may designate subordinate theaters or areas of operations (AOs) and joint task forces (JTFs) to engage each major threat. The theaters of operation refer to those portions of an area of war necessary for military operations and for the administration of such operations for extended periods.

COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

1-7. The communications zone (COMMZ) extends from the rear of the combat zone (CZ) in the theater of operations to the CONUS base. Its size may vary depending on the size of the theater of operations, size of forces required for operations and sustainment, depth required, lines of communications (LOC), enemy capability to interdict and disrupt sustainment operations, geography, and political boundaries. Within the COMMZ, the combatant/JTF commander normally establishes a theater base. The combatant/JTF commander usually locates the theater base at the junction of the various intratheater and intertheater LOC. It typically contains combat service support (CSS) facilities required to support the theater such as aerial and sea ports of debarkation (APOD/SPOD), marshaling areas, storage areas, theater staging bases, movement control points, and CSS headquarters and units. It also includes airfields and air bases, transitioning land forces, theater missile defense forces, the theater rear headquarters, and strategic reserves.

SECTION III. - ARMY SUPPORT IN THEATER

1-8. Force projection doctrine and the structure of the theater influence how the Army provides CSS in the theater. The Army service component commander (ASCC) supports the theater combatant commander by conducting Army operations to support or attain his objectives. For detailed discussion of ASCC functions and responsibilities refer to Field Manual (FM) 100-7.

ARMY SUPPORT STRUCTURE

1-9. Operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and elsewhere clearly demonstrated a need to establish CSS infrastructures in places where they do not exist. Building the support structure occurs after considering mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC); strategic lift; pre-positioned assets; host nation support (HNS) and other applicable agreements; and other factors of the logistics preparation of the theater (LPT) process. Commanders tailor their forces to meet the demands of specific crises. Key considerations are selecting a support structure appropriate to the mission and time-phasing its deployment. Balancing combat, combat support (CS), and CSS forces during deployment is crucial because commanders must seek to gain the initiative

early, protect the force, support the force, and simultaneously prepare for future operations. The CSS force must be regionally oriented, flexible, and properly tailored.

1-10. To satisfy this need, the Army developed a modular concept for opening theaters. Modularity allows for deploying only those capabilities needed for a particular mission. Typical theater-level early entry modules (EEMs) needed during the initial stages of deployment include C2, transportation, engineer, supply, personnel, finance, maintenance, port-opening, and medical modules; and strategic logistics cells from the United States Army Materiel Command (AMC), the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). These EEMs may be grouped under a task force called a theater force opening package (TFOP). Once on the ground, the TFOP can operate air and sea ports, prepare routes for onward movement, negotiate with the host nation (HN) for real estate needed for marshaling areas and staging bases, provide initial sustainment and medical support, coordinate movements within the theater, and accomplish other support missions as specified by the ASCC. The TFOP is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4 and Appendix A of this manual.

1-11. The ASCC/Army force (ARFOR) commander assembles and tailors modules to support the force, based on the mission assigned to it by the JFC. The support structure starts with a nucleus of minimum essential support functions and capabilities focused on force generation within the theater. As the deployed force grows, the support structure gains required capabilities. The theater support structure must provide support to the engaged forces; to units in or passing through the COMMZ; and to other units, activities, forces, and individuals as the JFC directs.

1-12. For limited operations, the ASCC/ARFOR commander has several options for commanding COMMZ support operations as discussed in FM 100-7. In larger, more mature operations, the complete TSC headquarters and required functional commands may deploy. For more details on the TSC refer to Chapter 3 of this manual and FM 63-4 (to be published). Figure 1-2 depicts command relationships of the TSC and the ASCC/ARFOR, Army supporting elements, and elements of the other Services.



Figure 1-2. Representative Joint Forces Relationships

CSS IMPLICATIONS OF MILITARY FORCE PROJECTION

1-13. Our ability to project power with the most capable forces, at the decisive time and place, relies on a focused CSS system that is responsive, flexible, and precise. Focused CSS provides rapid crisis response, tracks and redirects assets en route, and delivers tailored CSS packages directly to strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations. It is fully adaptive to the needs of our dispersed, mobile forces and provides support in hours or days versus weeks. It enables joint forces to be mobile, versatile, and projectable from anywhere in the world.

1-14. CSS functions must incorporate information technologies to transition from the rigid vertical organizations of the past. Modular and specifically tailored CSS packages must evolve in response to wide-ranging contingency requirements. Service and Defense agencies must work jointly and integrate with the civilian sector, where required, to take advantage of advanced business practices, commercial economies, and global networks. Active and reserve CSS forces, prepared for complete integration into joint operations, must provide CSS as long as necessary.

1-15. Information technologies in support of theater distribution and velocity management, enhance airlift, sealift, and pre-positioning capabilities. This enhancement ensures the lightening of deployment loads, assists to pinpoint CSS delivery systems, and extends the reach and longevity of systems currently in the inventory. The combined impact of these improvements will be a smaller, more deployable, and capable force.